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1. See American’s with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §
12112(b)(5)(A) (2000).
2. See generally Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53
STAN. L. REV. 223 (2000) (discussing the effect of the mandates on
the accommodated workers).
3. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 349, 480-94 (1992); Mark Kelman, Market
Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 833, 840-55 (2001);
Sherwin Rosen, Disability Accommodation and the Labor Market, in
DISABILITY AND WORK: INCENTIVES, RIGHTS, AND OPPORTUNITIES 18 (Carolyn
Weaver ed., 1991) [hereinafter DISABILITY AND WORK]. Contra Jolls,
supra note 2, at 290-300; Michael Ashley Stein, Labor Markets,
Rationality and Workers with Disability, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 314 (2000) (arguing that accommodating disabled workers is not
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Disability, Reciprocity, and “Real Efficiency”: 
A Unified Approach
Amy L. Wax, University of Pennsylvania Law School
Introduction
The American’s with Disabilities Act (ADA) requires private
employers to offer reasonable accommodation to disabled persons
capable of performing the core elements of a job.1 These
employment-related “accommodation mandates”2 have come under
attack by economists and economically-minded legal scholars.3 The
burdensome for employers).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
5. Although enhanced business from disabled customers may
sometimes help mitigate the cost of providing access by
increasing profits, I am unaware of any serious claim that this
will invariably make up for the costs of providing access.
2
main thrust of the attack focuses on efficiency: The claim is
that the costs of implementing the statutory commands outweigh
the benefits.
Efficiency-based objections to the workplace accommodation
mandates stand in contrast to responses to other parts of the
ADA. The statute requires that facilities open to the public,
including restaurants, businesses, hotels, and transportation, be
made accessible to the disabled.4 Although these access mandates
have been criticized as unwieldy and unfair to businesses,
efficiency-based attacks have been muted. Whether these mandates
increase net social welfare—or whether they just effect a
redistribution of a fixed or shrinking pie towards the disabled
and away from others—has not been a central issue in the debate.
For one thing, it is hard to deny that these accommodations will
require business owners to spend money without any guarantee of
recouping their costs.5 Thus, businesses will almost certainly
find themselves out-of-pocket to some extent. Second, the
efficiency of mandated access is not easy to calculate, since it
6. For a discussion of the basics of Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks
efficiencies, see generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
§ 1.2 (5th ed. 1998); see also infra note 20 and accompanying
text (discussing pros and cons of regulating directly instead of
allowing free markets to operate and redistributing surplus
resources through tax and transfer programs).
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requires putting a price on enhancements in the quality of lives
for disabled people with diverse afflictions and preferences. For
these reasons, as well as others, supporters and detractors of
access mandates may be less resistant to assigning as much or
more importance to distributional priorities and simple justice
as to efficiency concerns. 
With respect to employment mandates, in contrast, it is
understandable that “simple justice” might take a back seat.
Labor markets are a key part of a productive economy that is
geared towards generating wealth. There is a strong assumption—at
least in some quarters—that labor markets produce the greatest
amount of wealth overall when they operate along free market
lines to the greatest possible extent. An employment regime that
maximizes the size of the pie is desirable because it generates
the potential to make everybody better off. Even if the well-off
(and able-bodied) benefit more, reallocation from winners to
losers can turn a Kaldor-Hicks efficient situation into a Pareto-
superior one.6 Thus, although the intangible or indirect benefits
7. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The
Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1 (2000)
(arguing that participation in paid work is a key component of
social citizenship and a full and satisfying life in the
community); Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881
(2000) (same); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment
Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458
(2001) (same).
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of ADA-mandated inclusiveness in employment should not be
ignored,7 the fear is that the tangible and intangible benefits
the ADA brings to disabled workers may be outweighed by
potentially significant economic costs overall. So powerful is
the pull of the efficiency goal for labor markets that even
supporters of the ADA are at pains to show that the statute
advances efficiency and that the employment mandates are cost-
effective for employers and for society overall. There is a
reluctance to embrace head-on the position that if all of us—or
even some of us—must sacrifice wealth, welfare, or utility to put
disabled people to work and to integrate them into the mainstream
workforce, those goals are worth the price.
While ultimately reserving judgment on whether emphasis on
the efficiency of ADA job mandates is warranted, this Article
assumes the importance of that goal as a given. The Article
argues that many analyses of the cost-effectiveness of ADA
8. Disability law grants benefits to those unable to perform any
job, not to those whom employers are simply unwilling to hire.
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employment mandates suffer from a narrowness of scope and a lack
of social and political realism that impede a clear picture of
the statute’s true economic consequences. The confusion has led
efficiency-conscious ADA supporters to make strained and overly
optimistic assertions about the productivity of the disabled. I
argue that these efforts are unnecessary. One can defend the ADA
without assuming that every disabled job-seeker is as productive
as otherwise qualified able-bodied persons or can be made so
through accommodation. Rather, the argument is that the ADA may
eventually improve social welfare under a more plausible and
modest assumption: Many disabled persons, even if somewhat less
productive than the rest of the population, can nevertheless be
productively employed.
  In offering an analysis of the cost-effectiveness of the
ADA, this Article assumes the following social and legal
background conditions: First, our society will honor a minimum
commitment to provide basic support to those who cannot support
themselves through no fault of their own. This includes medically
disabled persons who, regardless of their potential productivity
with or without special accommodation, may be regarded by
employers as unqualified for available jobs as currently
structured.8 
The standard for benefits in practice is not so pure, since there
is potential in the law for overinclusiveness. This is partly due
to the use of a standing “listing” of conditions that establishes
entitlement regardless of actual work potential, and partly to
the system’s inability accurately to distinguish between
inability to do the job and the failure to get hired to do the
job. As a result, disability benefits may sometimes be paid to
persons who are unemployed for the latter reason as well as the
former. In addition, some disabled workers cannot work at any job
without accommodation. But a person need not prove that failure
to accommodate him is unlawful to qualify for benefits. See note
24, infra.
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Second, labor markets, both by custom and by law, do not
operate according to perfect neoclassical principles. Although
deviations from the ideal can be traced to many sources, some
distortions in labor markets are deliberately imposed by minimum
wage and equal pay statutes that set an effective floor on
compensation that may perturb or inflate wage structures at many
levels. In addition, information deficits and customary practices
grounded in the operation of human psychology may keep employers
from paying market-clearing wages that reflect each employee’s
individual marginal productivity in a particular job. Rather,
compensation for a job may reflect the average productivity of a
narrow band of “qualified” individuals. But disabled persons who
7
are otherwise “qualified” may deviate from that average
significantly, if only because they require costly accommodations
that detract from their net productivity. The end result may be
that employers must hire many of the disabled at wages that
exceed what they are really worth on a market geared to marginal
productivity.
 These two background conditions—society’s commitment to
provide subsistence to the “worthy” poor, and imperfect labor
markets that tend to overcompensate the disabled—may combine to
produce a situation in which, absent the legal commands of the
ADA, employers will shun some disabled workers who could be
productively employed, and the taxpayer will end up supporting
them. If markets were perfectly efficient, disabled persons
capable of producing net value would be hired at a market
clearing wage that reflects all costs and benefits for the
employer, including any “extra” costs of employing them. This
means they would be hired at a level of compensation that
reflects their “true” marginal productivity, even if that level
is less than it would be if they were not disabled. But if, as
hypothesized, employers will find themselves paying more than
that, many of these persons will not be hired. To be sure, some
employers will shun disabled workers due to irrational fears,
stereotypes, and unwarranted assumptions about their ability to
function on the job. Some discrimination against the disabled can
8
thus be characterized as “irrational” statistical discrimination.
But this discussion assumes that some significant portion of this
unwillingness to hire is traceable to a rational form of
statistical discrimination: employer decisions are based in part
on accurate assumptions about shortfalls in productivity,
exacerbated by factors militating towards “sticky” or excessive
compensation. 
If potentially productive disabled persons are kept out of
the market by employers’ fears of excessive costs, they will have
to find support elsewhere. As a practical matter, many persons
with a medical condition impeding job performance, if unable to
find work, will be granted benefits financed at taxpayer expense.
Society as a whole foots the bill through social welfare programs
that shunt resources to the “deserving” unemployed. Indeed, the
very existence of a safety net for the unemployed disabled tends
to pull marginal disabled workers out of the workforce, adding to
the legal and labor market factors already discussed. The effect
of these factors on social norms surrounding work will also play
a role. The more numerous the disabled unemployed, the more
substantial and salient the benefits program that supports them;
As more disabled persons leave the workforce for the disability
rolls, others will feel more comfortable joining them (and more
comfortable pursuing employment opportunities less vigorously). 
In sum, a society without the ADA would be one in which many
9
of the potentially productive disabled would not expect to work,
or would be unable to find work tailored to their tastes and
skills. Because so many would be unemployed, non-work would be
normatively more acceptable. This would cause the costs of
staying out of the workforce to be further reduced, which would
only accelerate a norm shift towards non-work.
The ADA “corrects” this situation by mandating the
accommodation and employment of disabled persons, albeit at an
inflated wage in some cases. This saves the taxpayers the costs
of supporting them in idleness, but at some cost to the employer
who must hire them and accommodate them at an inefficient wage.
Arguably the “able-bodied” employees who are displaced or whose
terms of employment are otherwise distorted by the ADA’s effects
on labor markets, pay some of this cost as well. If the disabled
employee is productive enough, however, the result could be net
positive for society as a whole. Thus, although employers in real
labor markets will sometimes be unwilling to hire and accommodate
potentially productive disabled persons, it might still be in
society’s interests that those persons work even if they are paid
more than they are worth, because otherwise the rest of us must
support them if they do not earn a “living wage.” 
On this view, the ADA can be seen as a way for taxpayers to
unload some of the costs of supporting the disabled population
onto employers who, in turn, may try to impose those costs on
10
other groups, such as non-disabled employees and consumers. In
effect, the ADA operates as a mechanism for the broad range of
taxpayers to impose “negative externalities” on employers and the
business community. This situation introduces the possibility of
a disconnect between what is in employers’ interest (refusing to
hire or accommodate many productive disabled persons at
prevailing rates of pay) and what is good for society as a whole
(putting the productive disabled to work). In effect, the ADA has
the potential to create a divergence between social and private
benefits. Although that divergence does not make inefficiency
inevitable, it does pose the danger of an inefficient result in
some cases. As explained more fully below, the potential
arbitrariness and unfairness implicit in this aspect of the ADA
scheme suggests that the ADA may stand in need of reform more on
fairness rather than on efficiency grounds. 
It should be noted, however, that this analysis is based on
the somewhat idealistic assumption that employers actually comply
with ADA requirements, either because they obey the law
spontaneously or because enforcement is effective enough to make
the mandates stick. If employers can be forced to comply with ADA
mandates, and those mandates, by hypothesis, impose costs on
employers that they would otherwise choose to avoid, then the ADA
would be expected to cause an increase in the number of disabled
persons with jobs. Whether the ADA has in fact had that effect is
9. Compare Daron Acemoglu & Joshua D. Angrist, Consequences of
Employment Protection? The Case of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 109 J. POL. ECON. 915, 917, 949 (2001)
(attributing findings of reduced employment levels of disabled
persons to the high costs of accommodation), with Julie
Hotchkiss, A Closer Look at the Employment Impact of the
Americans with Disabilities Act 23 (Mar. 2002) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (providing evidence that the
reduction in the employment rate among the disabled is actually a
product of “a reclassification of non-disabled labor force non-
participants as disabled” in order to evade the increased
stringency of welfare reform and take advantage of more generous
disability benefits). See also Douglas Kruse & Lisa Schur,
Employment of People with Disabilities Following the ADA, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 54TH ANNUAL MEETING (Industrial Relations Research
Assoc. ed., 2002) (forthcoming fall 2002) (manuscript at 27, on
file with author) (suggesting that the evidence on the effects of
the ADA do not clearly prove either an increase or a reduction in
employment levels for the disabled). An inherent difficulty that
potentially skews a reduction in employment levels for the
disabled). An inherent difficult that potentially skews research
data is the continuing lack of a clear-cut definition of
disability. Id. at 27; see also, Thomas Hale, The Lack of a
11
currently a subject of intense study and scholarly debate.9 If, 
Disability Measure in Today’s Current Populations Survey, MONTHLY
LAB. REV., June 2001, at 38, 39 (noting that the definition of
disability found in the March CPS supplement, which is a commonly
used source of data for these ADA claims, is distinctly different
from the ADA definition)). 
10. See J.H. Verkerke, Is the ADA Efficient?, U.C.L.A. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2003) (manuscript at 40, on file with author)
(discussing the academic argument that the difficulty of
enforcement causes levels of employment among the disabled to
fall).
11. See Christine Jolls, supra note 2, at 260 (describing tactics
employers can use to pass the costs of accommodation on to
workers, with the effectiveness of such tactics depending on the
“bite” of equal pay vs. nondiscrimination requirements). The ADA
may be even more costly for employers in medium sized firms,
which are nonetheless large enough to be covered by the statute.
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as some assert, the ADA has caused a decline in employment among
the disabled, that is most likely due to imperfect enforcement
which allows employers to evade the mandate by hiring fewer
disabled persons.10 But that evasive tactic also suggests that
compliance with the ADA hiring and accommodation requirements is,
indeed, expensive for many employers, and that employers will
find it easier to avoid hiring disabled workers than to recoup
their added costs by paying those workers less.11
These firms will find it more difficult to pass costs on to
employees. See Verkerke, supra note 11, at 917. In fact, some
employers may defy the ADA by avoiding hiring the disabled
despite effective enforcement if they view accommodation measures
as more costly than the threat of ADA-related litigation. See id.
(noting that “disemployment effects also appear to have been
larger in states in which there have been more ADA-related
discrimination charges”).
12. See Amy L. Wax, A Reciprocal Welfare Program, VA. J. SOC.
POL’Y. & L. 477 (2001); Amy L. Wax, Rethinking Welfare Rights:
Reciprocity Norms, Reactive Attitudes, and the Political Economy
of Welfare Reform, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 257 (2000) (offering an
evolutionary theory of how these entrenched attitudes arise); see
also Amy L. Wax, Something for Nothing, the Liberal Case Against
Welfare Work Requirements (forthcoming Emory L.J., Winter 2003).
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=S1Conditional Reciprocity and the Commitment to the “Deserving”
Unemployed
I have elsewhere explored the idea of conditional
reciprocity as a principle of social organization that commands
widespread political support in the United States and in modern
industrial societies generally.12 A system of distribution based
on social reciprocity principles can be viewed as an informal
insurance scheme whereby the community pledges minimum support to
certain groups during periods of economic misfortune or distress.
13. Wax, A Reciprocal Welfare Program, supra note 10, at 486.
14. Id. 
14
In exchange for this guarantee, individuals in these groups owe a
duty to not call upon group resources unnecessarily and to
achieve self-support through their own efforts to the extent
possible through reasonable effort on the labor market. As I have
noted elsewhere, this principle amounts to “recognizing the
community’s duty to make up any shortfall between what persons
can command on their own in the market or through private
arrangements [with other productive persons] and an amount
sufficient to support a minimally decent standard of living.”13
Under these circumstances, the collective, in effect, undertakes
to act as a surety of basic subsistence on the condition that
individuals make a reasonable effort to minimize the assistance
needed through self-help efforts. What constitutes a “reasonable
effort” depends on myriad economic and social conditions as well
as conventions about how hard people are expected to work, which
in turn depends on how much effort most people actually expend on
their own behalf.14
What does reciprocity have to do with the ADA and the
assessment of the efficiency of workplace mandates? Our social
welfare system generally—and our policies towards the disabled
specifically—are deeply informed by the logic of reciprocity,
which has far-reaching political currency, resonance, and
15. See Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Is Equality Passe? Homo
Reciprocans and the Future of Egualitarian Politics, BOSTON REV.,
Dec.-Jan. 1999, at 4, 4.
16. See, e.g., Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of
1984, 42 U.S.C.A. § 423(d)(1)(A) (West 1991) (defining the term
15
support.15 Consequently, we must accept that our society is not
prepared to abandon any person afflicted with a medically
recognized condition that impedes his ability to support himself.
If that person’s affliction prevents him from finding work or
earning enough to live, society is pledged to provide him with
sufficient resources for dignified survival.
What this means for our purposes is that any analysis of the
efficiency of putting disabled persons to work, whether through
accommodation mandates or otherwise, must be assessed in light of
society’s collective commitment to the disabled. The alternative
to mandates is not a free-for-all in which the public washes its
hands of the disabled and leaves them to their own devices.
Rather, the fallback is a determination to devote a certain
portion of collective resources to support disabled persons who
fail at independence because existing labor markets provide
inadequate outlets for their productive efforts. Indeed, the
default position in the United States prior to the enactment of
the ADA was a standing offer of benefits for disabled persons who
were “unqualified” for existing jobs.16 Employers were under no
“disability” as an “inability to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical
or mental impairment”).
17. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1382h (2002).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 401(a).
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., Helen Hershkoff & Stephen Loffredo, The Rights of
16
legal obligation to hire or accommodate these persons, and very
often did neither. But society was willing to step in and take up
the slack left by businesses’ unwillingness to hire or
accommodate.
The resources set aside for the needy disabled are generated
mostly through some form of taxation. Federal support for the
disabled, for example, is supplied through Supplemental Security
Income (SSI), which is a means-tested program financed from
general tax revenues.17 Another important source of benefits is
the Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI)
Program.18 Although OASDI is a work-based, insurance-style
program that is financed through shared worker-employer
contributions, it contains significant elements of
redistribution, with revenues collected from wealthy, healthy,
high-earning employees helping to support disabled former workers
and their disabled and non-disabled dependents.19 State programs,
often financed through general taxation, also play some role.20  
the Poor (1997) at 98-105: id. at 99 (describing states’ general
assistance programs for “poor people who are unable to find jobs
or are unable to work.”).
21. See, e.g., Scott A. Moss & Daniel A. Malin, Note, Public
Funding for Disability Accommodations: A Rational Solution to
Rational Discrimination and the Disabilities of the ADA, 33 HARV.
CIV. R. & CIV. LIB. L. REV. 197, 203-04 (1998) (suggesting that
17
The key questions for assessing the ADA’s efficiency are not
whether these resources will be forthcoming from the group, but
how much money the group would have to supply if there were no
ADA, and how that burden would be distributed. Also important is
the issue of whether there are any cost-effective methods for
reducing the amount of resources the group must provide or for
generating more resources overall for distribution. In other
words, assuming that the public will honor its implicit pledge to
provide disabled persons with some minimum level of public
support regardless of whether they work or not, is the system we
have in place for making good on that commitment as cost-
effective as it could be? In answering that question, it must not
be forgotten that the workers the ADA requires employers to hire
and accommodate are not completely unproductive individuals.
Rather, they are individuals who, although perhaps less
productive than others who qualify for similar jobs, are still
capable of producing value through their efforts.21
disability discrimination “affect[s] all taxpayers, who finance
public benefits for the unemployed disabled[,]” but noting that
such discrimination can be regarded as a “harmful externality”
only if some who receive benefits while out of the labor force
are capable of working productively).
22. See TRUMAN E. BEWLEY, WHY WAGES DON’T FALL DURING A RECESSION ch. 21
(1991) (discussing the disproportionate effect of wage reduction
on worker morale); BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed.,
18
=S1Labor Market Distortions: Why Compensation for the Disabled
May be Inflated
 
Because markets do not operate perfectly, compensation does
not always reflect productivity. Real-life labor markets are
characterized by deviations from what theory predicts would be
observed with perfectly “market clearing” compensation.
Persistent unemployment and hiring hierarchies or “queues” within
the ranks of the unemployed have not been fully explained, but
are thought to result in part from wage structures that fall
short of the neoclassical ideal. Long-standing customs and
practices, ill-understood quirks specific to labor markets, or
the operation of human psychology contribute to these patterns.
Morale problems arise from excessive differentiation in the
categorization of workers doing similar jobs. Workers do not like
to see their wages cut in response to economic downturns and
expect rising trajectories of pay over time.22 Moreover, the
2000); see also Bruce Kaufman, Expanding the Behavioral
Foundations of Labor Economics, 52 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 361
(1999).
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difficulty of monitoring productivity and other information
deficits make it hard for employers to assess each worker’s true
worth accurately, which impedes precise, individualized “price
discrimination” in setting compensation levels. Legal rules, such
as minimum wage laws and equal pay legislation, introduce
additional distortions by preventing employers from paying some
workers—including some disabled workers with depressed
productivity—what they are worth. All of these factors impede
employers’ ability to adjust wages to reflect productivity in
real time for disabled and non-disabled workers alike. 
Practices dictating that workers at the same job category
receive similar compensation despite non-trivial differences in
productivity may be particularly important in the case of the
disabled. Significant differences in pay for disabled workers
hired into designated jobs, even in the absence of any legal
proscription on discrimination against them, may prove awkward in
light of prevailing norms. Although some employers might be able
to place persons who are less productive due to a disability into
lower-paying or less demanding job categories than they would
occupy if not disabled, that option will not always be a feasible
one.  For example, a large urban law firm might not be
23. See Malin and Moss, supra note 19, at 206-09 (discussing
rational actors’ over-estimation of the benefits of
discriminating); Michelle A. Travis, Perceived Disabilities,
Social Cognition, and “Innocent Mistakes,” 55 VAND. L. REV. 481
(2002).
24. This suggests that repealing minimum wage laws and other
legal reforms would probably only solve some of the problems that
lead to idleness among the potentially productive disabled, with
the resulting loss of their wealth-producing capacities. 
Cognitive distortions, misperceptions, inaccurate
generalizations, and stereotypes would continue to operate
regardless of whether the law encourages hiring the disabled by
making it easier to pay employees what they are worth.  This
20
comfortable hiring an academically adept deaf Harvard Law
graduate as an “assistant” for half the salary paid to classmates
hired as “associates.”  If that option is uncomfortable, the firm
may avoid hiring the blind associate altogether.
To be sure, there are other factors at work that are
specific to the disabled. Employers harbor misconceptions about
the disabled that prevent them from acting “rationally.” There is
evidence that cognitive distortions, stereotyping, and the
excessive saliency of disabilities23 interfere with employers’
ability to assess disabled job candidates accurately and further
undermine rational economic choices.24 Thus, some employers who
observation adds weight to the argument herein that employers
should be required by law to take on workers whose productivity
is positive although perhaps less than that of their able-bodied
counterparts.
21
fail to hire the disabled will be moved by irrational
misconceptions about productivity. Others, however, will respond
to rational fears that disabled workers will not prove cost-
effective. Some employers who would willingly make cost-
effective, productivity-enhancing accommodations if they believed
they could recoup those costs by adjusting pay levels for
accommodated workers would fail to do so if compensation is
artificially inflated. If that happened, some significant number
of potentially productive disabled persons would not be hired at
all in the absence of the ADA. The result would be that the
productive capacity of the passed-over disabled workers would
never be utilized. Assuming that in many cases net productivity
would be greater than zero, that loss is a deadweight loss. 
=S1The Subsistence Guarantee and Imperfect Labor Markets: How Do
These Affect “Real Efficiency”?
To illustrate how taking the subsistence guarantee in
combination with labor market distortions and “sticky
compensation” as a baseline can change the efficiency calculus
for requiring workplace accommodation of the disabled, consider
the following hypothetical example. Suppose disabled person Mr. A
25. See supra note 8 (discussing concept that benefits
eligibility is in practice broader than the law strictly allows);
see also Jerry L. Mashaw, Against First Principles, 31 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 211 (1994).
26. See Cleveland v. Pol’y Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 796
(1999) (“[T]he SSA does not take into account the possibility of
‘reasonable accommodation’ in determining SSDI eligibility”);
Matthew Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies: The Tensions
Between the Americans with Disabilities Act and Federal
Disability Benefit Programs, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1003 (1998).
22
receives $500 per month in disability benefits, and
assume that social convention would recognize $500 as the amount
necessary to maintain him at a minimally decent standard of
living. The award of benefits is supposed to be based on a
finding that no job currently exists in the economy for which Mr.
A is now qualified, given his education, age, and skills.25
Since, under current law, the disability finding need not
consider the obligation of employers under the ADA to alter job
requirements to accommodate disabled workers,26 the finding of
disability reflects the inability to perform existing jobs in an
“unaccommodated” job market.  In practice, however, the finding
is also made against the backdrop of laws that would block an
employer from paying Mr. A a wage below a minimum amount, even if
that lower wage appropriately reflected Mr. A’s net lower
23
productivity on the job as well as the costs of accommodating him
to enable him to be (more) productive. Even if Mr. A’s actual
performance would entitle him to a salary above the minimum, the
employer may not feel free to reduce Mr. A’s compensation to a
level significantly below that received by other employees
performing similar jobs. Thus, an employer X could easily find
himself paying Mr. A more than he is “worth,” such that employing
Mr. A is a net loss for X. Although Mr. A is capable of
generating a net positive output and employing him could
potentially be profitable, employer X may nevertheless resist
hiring him because employing him is in fact not profitable at the
wage the employer would be forced to pay. 
Enforcing an accommodation mandate can make sense, however,
even if the employer would still lose money by employing Mr. A.
Suppose that employer X has vacancies for a job that ordinarily
pays $600 per week. Suppose that if X spends nothing to
accommodate Mr. A in the workplace, Mr. A’s productivity on that
particular job, were he to be hired, would be so low that it
would be worth paying him only $200 per week. If X were to invest
$50 per week in accommodation-related measures involving job
restructuring, special equipment, and the like, Mr. A’s output
would be doubled from $200 to $400. After paying for the
accommodation, it would be cost-effective for X to hire Mr. A at
a higher salary of $350 per week. 
24
It follows that if the law requires that X hire Mr. A, it
will be cost-effective to accommodate him. If Mr. A is not
accommodated to the tune of $50 per week, his productivity will
be considerably lower. An expenditure of $50 per week doubles Mr.
A’s productivity and justifies raising his salary from $200 to
$350. Since X is constrained to pay him $600, the accommodation
expenditure is worthwhile from the employer’s point of view,
since without it the employer would pay him $400 per week more
than he is worth ($600 - $200), whereas with the accommodation,
the employer will be out only $250 per week ($600 - ($400 -
$50)). For the very same reason, however—that is, because the
accommodation enhances Mr. A’s productivity by more than the cost
of the accommodation—hiring and accommodating Mr. A is efficient
overall. Without the accommodation, society as a whole will forgo
the net gain in utility from Mr. A’s accommodated effort on the
job. Therefore, assuming that we require that Mr. A be hired, he
should be hired with accommodation. 
Should we demand that employer X hire Mr. A, even at a
potentially inflated wage, and even if employing Mr. A at $600
per week might not be cost-effective for that employer? If we
look in isolation at the economics of X’s workplace hiring
decision, it is understandable why critics of the ADA might
suggest that hiring Mr. A and accommodating his disability are
not “efficient” moves.  But that assertion fails to take into
27. See generally Sherwin Rosen, Disability Accommodation and the
Labor Market, in DISABILITY AND WORK, supra note 3, at 18.
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account the divergence the ADA creates in this case between
private and public costs.  What is inefficient for the employer
is efficient for society as a whole.
We start with the understanding that the option of paying
Mr. A $350 after expending $50 on accommodation—the cost-
effective strategy—is not open to X. The pay for the job into
which Mr. A is hired is $600. Even if that is well above the
minimum wage, we assume that the employer would find it difficult
to pay less. It goes without saying that if X must pay that
amount to a person in that job, he would prefer to hire a
nondisabled person who can generate a profit at that wage, rather
than Mr. A, who generates a loss. By hiring Mr. A, the employer
will suffer a loss from employing someone whose productivity does
not justify his cost. The employer might try to recoup those lost
profits in several ways. If some of his workers are supplied
inelastically, the employer will try to pass on the costs by
reducing other workers’ average wage; or, if labor is supplied
elastically, he will lay off nondisabled workers from jobs in
which they would otherwise be efficiently employed.27
Alternatively, some productive workers might be forced to reduce
their hours of work.
The overall result of these compensatory moves is a net
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reduction in total wealth or welfare for that employer and/or his
workers. It could be argued that this net reduction will never
come to pass: the fact that hiring Mr. A hurts employer X will
excuse that employer from hiring him in the first place. The ADA
does not require employers to hire disabled workers who are a
losing proposition. But, based on this hypothetical, it is far
from clear that courts would apply the law this way in cases like
this. The fact that Mr. A performs his job inefficiently does not
necessarily prevent him from persuading a court that he can
perform the job’s core requirements. And the accommodation that
allows him to perform more efficiently may not look like it
imposes an “undue burden” on these facts. If Mr. A is not
unproductive, and the suggested accommodations enhance his
productivity significantly, requiring the employer to make them
may appear quite reasonable, especially in light of what Mr. A
actually earns.
That the employer would possibly end up losing money on Mr.
A does not mean, however, that employing him is inefficient
overall. Although hiring Mr. A may not be cost-effective for the
employer within the constraints established by law and the
reality of the workplace, it may be efficient for society as a
whole if Mr. A goes to work. The analysis cannot be complete
without factoring in the money that must inevitably be collected
from taxpayers and disbursed by the public to support Mr. A if he
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cannot find a job, go to work, and contribute his productive
efforts to generating the wealth necessary to support himself. If
X does not hire Mr. A, Mr. A will remain idle. If he remains
idle, his potentially productive contribution will be entirely
lost. If that contribution is lost, society must foot the entire
bill for his support without any cost sharing or mitigation. In
effect, Mr. A loses the opportunity to help defray his own cost
of living, and that burden falls entirely on others.  
The terms of our hypothetical suggest that Mr. A’s efforts
are worth something—he is capable of achieving substantial net
positive productivity by working, and in particular by working at
the job we have identified at employer X. Even if he is not
accommodated, his net productivity is hardly negligible, as
evinced by X’s judgment that it would be worth paying him $200
per week to perform the job at issue. He is even more productive
if certain changes were made in the job or at the workplace. A
$50 accommodation causes his productivity to jump to a level that
would justify a $350 per week salary.
But a society committed to Mr. A’s subsistence will make
sure, as noted above, that he receives at least $500 per week. If
X does not hire Mr. A and he cannot find work, he will receive
$500 in government benefits. That $500 will be collected through
taxation of some kind. Depending on the type of levy chosen, that
money will come out of the pockets of workers (through income
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taxes or worker contribution taxes); consumers (through sales
taxes); property owners (through property taxes); or other
citizens (through user fees). Although the employer himself will
be out of pocket $250 per week by employing and accommodating Mr.
A at a wage of $600, the taxpayers will gain $500, for a net
savings to society overall of $250. What makes up the difference
is the value generated by Mr. A if he goes to work, which is lost
if he does not. Although taxpayers win and employer X loses, the
net result is positive. In other words, the ADA requirement that
Mr. A be hired and accommodated may, under those circumstances,
produce a result that is more cost-effective than not imposing
those mandates. 
Economists will object that this analysis is too simple: the
hiring mandate will introduce costly “distortions” in labor
markets that must be factored into the equation. It can be
argued, however, that our hypothetical does fully account for
such distortionary effects.  The equation is arguably complete by
looking at Mr. A’s productivity (utilized or forgone), the
employer’s costs of compensation and accommodation, and society’s
bill for supporting Mr. A if he is not employed. By calculating
the employer’s out-of-pocket costs from hiring Mr. A instead of a
more productive non-disabled worker, our example would appear to
account for the loss in productivity that results from that
mandated displacement. To be sure, the employer may well try to
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pass on the extra costs to his other employees or to consumers.
But that does not alter the conclusion that hiring Mr. A still
looks worthwhile from the point of view of the system as a whole,
despite the costs it imposes on businesses who employ the
disabled.  
When examined in light of the forgoing analysis, the ADA’s
predicted effects on total social wealth and well-being become
less clear cut and more equivocal and contingent. The claim here
is not that the ADA will always be efficient, but only that the
ADA’s purportedly negative effects on overall social welfare are
not as obvious as free-market, neoclassical economists suggest.
In predicting that mandates that disturb the “rational” operation
of labor markets will always produce welfare-reducing
inefficiencies, these analysts conveniently overlook the fact
that, without the ADA, many disabled persons might be wastefully
unemployed and would require support from the rest of us.
Factoring in these observations suggests that the answer to
whether the ADA is efficient may depend on many contingent facts
about labor market structures and disabled workers’ skills.
Although the mandates might generate a net loss in some
circumstances, in others they would not. The question comes down
to whether and when the “distortions” created by requiring
employers to hire the disabled at prevailing levels of
compensation for designated positions will outweigh the public
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savings that result when disabled persons are enabled to
contribute to their own support.
In attempting to get a handle on whether the ADA ends up
making society as a whole better or worse off, it may help to
look in more detail at the burden imposed on the able-bodied
population with or without the statute in place. As noted above,
some of the costs of supporting disabled people in the absence of
the ADA will be paid through programs that are formally
structured as worker self-insurance, such as OASDI. The costs of
other programs, such as SSI and state benefits programs, are met
out of general tax revenues. As noted, despite its designation as
an “insurance” program, OASDI has a systematic redistributive
component. Therefore, the public commitment to supporting the
disabled visits an effective “wage reduction” on many or most
workers in the form of the taxes necessary to support these
disbursements.  
On one side of the equation are the losses that may result
from forcing employers to hire disabled workers—costs that non-
disabled workers may be forced to bear on the front end in the
form of lower pay, less desirable jobs, shorter working hours, or
increased unemployment. But absent the ADA, non-disabled workers
will bear costs on the back end in the form of higher taxes that
are needed to fund the disability programs that support
unemployed disabled workers. The tax-and-transfer option may
28. See generally Mashaw, supra note 23.
29. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules
Favor the Poor? Claifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income
Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821 (2000); Chris
William Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for
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itself have distortive effects: transfer payments can reduce
incentives for the disabled to seek work aggressively,28 which
may depress levels of employment and productivity even further.
Taxes on the working population that are used to fund disability
benefits also reduce incentives to work, which further increases
the costs of any alternative to an ADA-type regime. The question
once again comes down to whether the magnitude of the costs on
one side of the ledger will necessarily be greater than those on
the other, taking into account the welfare of workers and the
burdens and benefits on the system overall.  The analysis cannot
look in isolation at the effect of the ADA on labor markets.  It
must also consider the existence of alternative programs for the
disabled.  The situation must be analyzed as a whole.
To be sure, a complete analysis of whether the overall
effects of the tax-and-transfer option are likely to be better or
worse than direct regulation through the ADA must take account of
a broader debate on the relative virtues of redistribution
through direct regulation versus paying subsidies from taxes
collected on the proceeds of unregulated markets.29  The ADA
Equity, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 797 (2000).
30. See articles cited supra note 27.
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shunts resources towards the disabled by regulating the workplace
to make jobs more available to them, whereas traditional benefits
leave the employment sphere (relatively) undisturbed, and
transfer funds collected through taxes directly to disabled
persons. The tax-and-transfer alternative appears superior on the
assumption that mandated hiring of the disabled effects a one-
for-one displacement of more productive, able-bodied persons.
Although those persons must pay part of their earnings to help
support the disabled, it makes more sense to tax the more
productive to support the less productive than to allow the
latter to displace the former in the workforce. 
A large body of literature exists that compares regulatory
and transfer options, but suffice it to say that the virtues and
vices of the alternatives are a matter of some contention. The
conventional wisdom that tax-and-transfer is more efficient than
direct regulation is based on ideal assumptions about well-
functioning markets and economically rational behavior. That
position has not gone unchallenged and its validity is
acknowledged to vary depending on setting and circumstance.30
When, as with disability programs, the options are superimposed
on a regulated or less than perfectly rational market scheme, the
advantages of transfers over direct regulation cannot be
31. It should be added, however, that those benefits may be
counterbalanced by the loss of leisure that more work for the
disabled entails.
33
predicted ahead of time. In particular, it is far from clear that
hiring the disabled will effect a proportional reduction in work
by the more productive able-bodied that will cause net losses to
exceed gains. Morevoer, the discussion so far has taken no
account of the social and psychological benefits of workplace
participation that accrue to the disabled under the ADA but not
under the tax-and-transfer regime, and which must be charged in
the ADA’s favor.31
At bottom, however, theoretical insights cannot be
dispositive: which route costs more in the context of disability
policy is ultimately an empirical matter. Contingent factors that
may affect the comparative efficiency of regulatory and transfer
alternatives in the disability setting include the prevalence of
different types of disabilities, the spectrum of jobs that are
available in the economy, the productivity of people with various
disabilities as they perform available jobs, and the technology
that develops to accommodate those persons. Other contingent
factors include: the cost of those accommodations, the effect of
those accommodations on productivity, the costs of supporting
disabled persons who do not work, and the generosity of benefits.
Also potentially important are the incentive effects on work
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effort for different segments of the population from the taxation
needed to support generous benefits programs and the incentive
effects on the disabled from receiving benefits. Finally, it is
not clear that the sum total of jobs is fixed, to the point that
employment for the disabled spells unemployment for others.
Rather, an increase in the effective supply of labor might result
in more persons being employed overall. 
Against the uncertainty of how these factors stack up in
practice, no one option is clearly superior in every
circumstance. It is at least reasonable to conclude that
mandating the hiring of disabled workers and reducing the
employment tax burden generally might sometimes prove better than
taxing able-bodied workers to support the idle, even if some
able-bodied persons work fewer hours under the mandate. If many
disabled persons will not find work without the ADA, and if that
in turn discourages other disabled persons from pursuing
employment by making non-work more normatively acceptable, the
forgone productivity of the unemployed disabled population could
potentially impose considerable social costs and overwhelm
countervailing efficiency gains. 
It may be objected that the hypothetical case of Mr. A above
has been rigged to indulge the rosy assumption that hiring and
accommodating him will be cost-effective for society overall. Mr.
A, however, is not necessarily representative of most disabled
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persons. Does the ADA operate efficiently for disabled persons
who are less productive than Mr. A, or who do not improve
productivity with accommodation, or who require expensive
accommodations that may outweigh productivity gains? If
accommodation costs exceed productivity gains, adding someone to
the labor force would appear to be a losing proposition not only
for the employer but also for the system as a whole. The
divergence between private and social costs disappears and net
gains become negative.  At the extremes, even a complete
deregulation of wage markets would offer no relief: the person
simply costs more to put to work than to maintain in idleness
outside the labor market. In that case, hiring and accommodating
a disabled worker would make no economic sense at all. 
 Consider the example of Mr. B, who produces negligible
value without special accommodation and would not be worth hiring
into any job at any rate of pay under those circumstances. Assume
further, however, that an accommodation that costs $200 per week
enables Mr. B to produce slightly more than $150 in value for
that period. If there were no accommodation costs, or if those
costs were subsidized, the employer would pay him $150 per week.
Factoring in accommodation costs, the employer is guaranteed to
be out at least $50 per week. It should be clear that employing
Mr. B can never be cost-effective, regardless of the level of
compensation and type and degree of accommodation, so even a zero
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pay rate would fail to make employing him economically
worthwhile. Unlike with Mr. A, employing Mr. B in the job at
issue will produce a deadweight loss overall regardless of the
rate of pay. Not only will the employer lose money, but the
system as a whole will too. 
It is important to note, however, that even in these
circumstances taxpayers might choose to mandate that employers
hire and accommodate Mr. B. That is, taxpayers might vote to
bring persons like Mr. B within the scope of the ADA, despite the
fact that this would be the inefficient result in that setting.
The key here is to realize that the ADA permits taxpayers to
externalize or shift costs from themselves onto employers. Their
incentive to do so exists in settings in which the ADA operates
efficiently (as with Mr. A) or inefficiently (as with Mr. B). The
point once again is that Mr. B’s cost of support—say $500—must be
paid by someone. If Mr. B is hired by employer X and paid $Y
dollars, that means that fewer dollars must be supplied by the
public to support Mr. B. If $Y is less than $500 (that is, less
than a subsistence wage), the public saves at least ($500-$Y).
The taxpayer still comes out ahead, even if the government agrees
to “supplement” Mr. B’s meager salary with a benefits payment
worth ($500 - $Y). If $Y (which is Mr. B’s salary) is greater
than $500, the taxpayers are spared the entire cost of Mr. B’s
support. In either case, the cost to the employer is $Y + $50 and
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the total cost to the system is ($500 - $Y) + ($Y + $50), or
$550. Although taxpayers save money, they have shifted the
expense of Mr. B’s upkeep to the employer, who must now bear an
“inefficient” extra $50 burden. It makes no sense for Mr. B to go
to work at a net cost of $550 to the system when he will cost the
system only $500 if he doesn’t work. Because the ADA invites the
public to impose a negative “externality” on employer X in this
case, however, it is no surprise that the outcome is an
inefficient one. This is just one example of a setting in which a
transaction that generates a negative externality yields an
inefficient result.
To be sure, it could be argued that the “undue burden”
language in the ADA might excuse the employer from hiring and
accommodating Mr. B on these facts. After all, the accommodation
negates Mr. B’s effective productivity. However, if the
compensation paid to Mr. B significantly exceeds his productivity
and dwarfs the costs of accommodating him, and if the
accommodation does indeed boost his productivity (even though it
does not do so cost effectively), This might create the
impression that the accommodation is efficient overall. So the
outcome of any challenge to ADA-mandated employment plus
accommodation on facts like these is not a forgone conclusion.
Yet another possibility worth considering is that of a
disabled person who is productive at a low level without
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accommodation, but whose productivity could be enhanced by an
accommodation that is prohibitively expensive. For example,
suppose Mr. C could produce $50 worth of value without a
requested accommodation, but $100 with a $200 proposed
accommodation. If Mr. C must be paid more than $50, the employer
loses either way. This scenario differs from that posed by Mr. B,
however: society only loses under the latter scenario
(accommodation for Mr. C), but not under the former (no
accommodation), although the employer will be out-of-pocket under
both scenarios. Thus, despite its positive effect on gross
productivity, the accommodation the employee seeks has a negative
effect on net productivity and should not be made. Yet it is
unclear whether the ADA would get the right result here or
whether accommodation would be excused under these circumstances.
A person whose productivity is greater than zero but not very
high might demand an expensive accommodation that enhances his
gross productivity significantly (but reduces his net
productivity overall) because it appears to make him a more
valuable employee. Although granting that request makes little
economic sense, the accommodation may seem worthwhile to a court
if it makes the disabled person appear to be producing more. Once
again, the court might be misled if the person’s relatively low
productivity is masked by his (inflated) compensation. The costs
of the requested accommodation may not be very large relative to
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the employee’s apparent worth as reflected by that yardstick,
which is salient to courts. 
Consider the example of a blind lawyer hired by a large
urban law firm. A reader or assistant may enable the lawyer to do
legal work, but the assistant may prove so expensive that the
productivity gains are effectively wiped out. Yet because the
lawyer is paid many times what the assistant earns, and the
assistant undeniably enhances the lawyer’s output, the
accommodation may appear reasonable. Once again, the picture
presented to a court will be colored by a level of pay for the
job that is geared to what most able-bodied lawyers earn. And
there may be some blind lawyers who more than earn their keep
despite the costs of assisting them. But whether a demand for
accommodation in cases like this would pass muster under the ADA
depends on how the court analyzed the issue. It is not hard to
imagine how a result that is cost-ineffective even by the
criterion of “real efficiency” might emerge.
=S1Disability, Low Ability, and Reciprocal Obligations
In addition to its implications for the design of disability
policies and the wisdom of the ADA, the discussion so far
suggests broader ramifications for policies regarding unskilled
labor generally. 
As noted above, central to the idea of reciprocation in the
social and economic sphere is the view that the collective should
32. See Wax, A Reciprocal Welfare Program, supra note 10, at 477,
478-85.
33. See id.
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commit to bringing all individuals up to a baseline level of
well-being, provided those persons make some reasonable effort to
contribute to their own support through work.32 Conditions other
than medical disabilities, such as low skills and unfortunate
life circumstances, can compromise a person’s ability to meet
labor market demands and to achieve minimum levels of economic
well-being through work in the paid economy.  Factors that cause
poor performance in the labor market include inadequate
education, deficient upbringing, low intelligence, lack of
talent, bad luck, drug addiction, and imprudent choices. At least
some of these might be regarded as effectively outside a person’s
control.  Persons with some of these problems and deficiencies
might be regarded as “deserving” of assistance within the
reciprocity paradigm. Even those whose current prospects have
been compromised by poor past choices might be regarded as
entitled to help under a less exacting version of the reciprocity
principle that makes room for forgiveness and second chances.33
In any event, there will always be some apparently “able-
bodied” persons who cannot realistically achieve self-sufficiency
through work despite good faith efforts and a strong desire to
participate in the workforce. Some workers are unable to find
34. See 26 U.S.C. § 32 (2000).
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employment or full-time employment. Others can only secure and
hold down jobs that do not pay enough to maintain themselves or
support a family. Like many of the disabled, such persons are
potentially productive and thus, in some sense, employable, but
not economically independent. A commitment to social reciprocity
recognizes a collective obligation to make up the difference
between what these “bottom-rung” workers can command on the
market and what is necessary to secure a minimally decent
standard of living. As noted, reciprocity appears to create a
kind of sliding scale of obligation that commits society to
maintaining a floor below which no one will be allowed to fall so
long as he expends reasonable efforts on his own behalf.  If a
person’s relatively low productivity prevents him from achieving
independent self-support, the collective must somehow close the
gap. 
How can that be done? Several existing and proposed programs
are consistent with honoring this commitment and its conditions.
Congress has recently expanded and revised the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC), which represents a scheme for “supported work.”
The EITC boosts worker income above a minimum threshold through
tax abatements and refundable tax credits.34 The EITC comports
roughly with reciprocity principles by offering help only to
those who enter the paid labor market. Proposals for wage
35. See EDMUND PHELPS, REWARDING WORK: HOW TO RESTORE PARTICIPATION AND SELF
SUPPORT TO FREE ENTERPRISE (1997); But see generally Anne Alstott,
Work vs. Freedom, 108 YALE L. J. 967 (1999) (critiquing wage and
job subsidy proposals, including Phelps’s ideas).
36. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 480-94 (proposing a grant
to set up “special workshops” for the disabled); PHELPS, supra
note 33, at 35 (designing governmental wage subsidies to minimize
employer incentives to lower wages); Alstott, supra note 33
(discussing windfalls to employers as well as other
administrative issues and information problems surrounding wage
subsidies); Mashaw, supra note 23 (arguing that replacing the ADA
with a mandate requiring the employment of the disabled will
better society); Moss & Malin, supra note 19, at 197 (discussing
the problem of “buying the base,” which “refers to the
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subsidies for low income workers operate along similar lines: by
reserving benefits for workers, they recognize the importance and
value of work but make good on a collective commitment to raise
workers above the poverty line.35  Exactly how these programs
should be designed and administered, and which options are most
consistent with our theoretical and political obligations, are
debatable questions. Moreover, the difficulties of administering
such proposals without creating wasteful windfalls and generating
perverse incentives are well-known and have been extensively
reviewed elsewhere.36  The basic idea, however, is that every
possibility that the funding program will merely bankroll [those]
accommodations that would have been made in the absence of
funding.” Id. at 234).
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person who fulfills social expectations by performing a
reasonable amount of labor should be able to take care of basic
needs. The route to accomplishing this goal may be difficult, but
the principle is clear enough. 
Although the recognition of an obligation to assist persons
who are needy despite their best efforts would seem to extend to
those unable to command a living wage due to low ability or lack
of skills as well as to those who cannot support themselves due
to a medical disability, in actual practice there may be reasons
to accord these categories distinct treatment. It is often easier
to establish the link between low productivity and a medical
cause than between low productivity and bona fide “low ability,”
because it is harder to distinguish lack of native talent from
plain old laziness or the type of dysfunction that is amenable to
an exercise of will.  There is irreducible moral hazard in
recognizing entitlement to assistance for failure on the job
market without an objectively verifiable cause. Moreover, the
reasons why persons without obvious disabilities fail in the job
market are a matter of hot dispute, with opinions differing on
whether poor performance is mostly due to volitional factors or
to a combination of innate and environmental conditions that are
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beyond persons’ effective control. The fault lines in these
debates implicate deep disagreements about human responsibility
itself. Some deny that people should be penalized by a welfare
system when behaviors such as educational failure, drug use,
criminal conduct, or bearing children too early or outside of
marriage tend to compromise employability. Others adhere to the
more traditional view that, because these behaviors are within
the individual’s effective control, their consequences should not
give rise to standing entitlements to public assistance.
Assuming, however, that at least some forms of job failure
can fairly be regarded as not a worker’s “fault” or as
effectively beyond a worker’s control, it is unclear why society
should not treat the causes of those failures like medical
disabilities for purposes of redistribution and support. But the
similarities between the disabled and some persons who fail at
self-support for other reasons for which they are not entirely
responsible suggests that the treatment accorded these groups
should converge in more ways than one. If some of the non-
disabled who perform poorly in the job market should be treated
like the disabled by being offered public help if they need it,
then why should not the disabled be treated like the non-disabled
in other respects? Non-disabled persons are expected to seek and
perform work to the extent they are able. If they fail despite
reasonable efforts through no fault of their own, society
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supports them. But the support is forthcoming only on the
assumption that they have already tried and failed. They are not
excused from working altogether simply by virtue of possessing
traits that make it difficult for them to find work, or to earn
enough to be entirely self-supporting.  
Why then, do we not expect the same from medically disabled
persons as well? It is particularly hard to see why persons with
conventional disabilities should ever be categorically excused
from expending the reasonable efforts towards self support that
we routinely expect from persons who have difficulties on the job
market for other reasons. Persons whose paucity of marketable
skills prevent them from obtaining jobs that pay enough to
support themselves or their families, regardless of the cause of
that deficit, are nonetheless expected to go to work. This
expectation suggests that we should jettison the notion that
being afflicted with a medical disability necessarily excuses a
person from work.  To be sure, the question of whether a
medically disabled person should be expected to work makes no
sense if a medical disability is defined strictly as a condition
that prevents a person from doing any work at all in the paid
economy. But, as already noted, the group of persons who end up
receiving disability benefits even under this legal definition
almost certainly includes some who could do existing work, and
many more who could work productively if accommodated. The
37. See, e.g., Diller, supra note 24 (arguing that the ADA
created a “right to work”); Gregory S. Kavka, Disability and the
Right to Work, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF
THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 186-187 (Leslie Francis & Anita
Silvers eds., 2000). Contra, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 3; WALTER
OLSON, THE EXCUSE FACTORY: HOW EMPLOYMENT LAW IS PARALYZING THE AMERICAN
WORKPLACE (1997).
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question is whether recognition of such a duty also entails a
responsibility on society’s part to alter jobs to accommodate the
disabled.
There has been much debate in the wake of the ADA about
whether disabled persons have a “right” to work.37 Very little
discussion has been devoted to whether disabled persons should be
obligated to work towards the goal of self-support just like
other persons. Reciprocity principles suggest that the disabled
should be treated the same as everyone else, subject to the
standing collective pledge to make up for the difference between
what they can achieve by dint of their own efforts and what they
need. Asking that the disabled try to work, however, gives rise
to a further question: Does accepting disabled persons’ duty to
work if they can entail an obligation by society to make work
available to them by redesigning existing jobs? Which alternative
comports best with reciprocity’s requirements: excusing persons
with medical impairments from working altogether if they cannot
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manage to obtain jobs within existing labor markets, or striving
to put as many people as possible to work by requiring employers
to make the kinds of accommodations that would enable more
disabled persons to work and work productively? 
The latter seems more effectively to vindicate the notion
that everyone should exert reasonable efforts to contribute
something to social production and self-maintenance. Reciprocity
stresses mutual obligation. Moreover, recognizing that disabled
persons should work and that society should accommodate them
would in practice enhance the sum total of social resources by
shifting the disabled as a group away from a norm of non-work
towards one of work. Disability benefits programs, as the last
bastion for the severely impaired, would shrink in size, as the
social expectation for most disabled persons would be employment
of some kind. 
The duty to work should arguably not be seen as absolute;
rather, it runs out at the extremes. So should the duty to
accommodate. There is a strong case to be made that society need
not offer accommodations to the hypothetical Mr. B or Mr. C
described above. That is, Mr. B or Mr. C should not be entitled
to accommodations that would enhance their “productivity” viewed
in isolation, if factoring in the accommodation costs generates a
net loss overall. Indeed, perhaps Mr. B should be excused from
work altogether, since his employment could never be cost-
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effective. That is, society might elect to excuse non-work on the
part of persons who are more expensive to keep at work than to
support in idleness. Correspondingly, society should perhaps be
relieved of the obligation to provide work to individuals who are
not net productive, regardless of how much those persons want to
work and how much they believe that working will benefit them.
There would still be many cases, however, in which the offer of a
reasonable accommodation would both enhance social welfare
overall and best comport with the commands of social reciprocity.
In those cases, accommodations should be forthcoming.
This discussion potentially sheds light on yet another
important aspect of the debate surrounding the ADA and how it
operates in real-world markets. The discussion so far suggests
that a core commitment to the disabled—and to others who struggle
in the world of work—need not be all-or-nothing. Rather, fidelity
to the motivating principles of reciprocity would dictate a
graduated response that is geared to the shortfall between what
an individual can command by dint of his own efforts and the
subsistence minimum. Despite the existence of minimum wage laws
and the EITC, many of the disabled (as well as other non-disabled
workers) cannot fully support themselves through work, either
because they are unable to hold down a full-time job, or because
even the minimum wage as it is supplemented through various
38. See Wax, A Reciprocal Welfare Program, supra note 10, at 477,
501-09 (discussing this problem of the “working poor”).
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programs is not currently a “living wage” for some families.38
Likewise, even in a deregulated environment and despite
productivity-boosting and cost-effective accommodations, someone
like Mr. A in the example above might still look to the rest of
us for some assistance. By hypothesis, if A were paid a salary
that reflected his true output, he would earn much less than the
$600 he is assigned in the example and less than he would need to
live in dignity and without want. Thus, in a perfectly free
market, the non-disabled population would often be called upon to
contribute some amount towards the support of persons like Mr. A
to the extent their productivity does not warrant paying them
enough to support themselves. 
Moves towards deregulating worker compensation—such as the
repeal of the minimum wage and equal pay laws so desired by free-
marketeers—would likely require society to pay more, not less, to
honor its obligations towards the “worthy” poor. Of course, not
every disabled person will require assistance to achieve an
acceptable standard of living. Some workers, even assuming their
disability compromises their productivity, might still earn
enough even on a deregulated wage market to cover basic needs.
The reciprocity paradigm does not demand that these individuals
be brought up to the level of compensation received by everyone
39. Those minimum requirements may justly vary for different
subgroups. For example, it may not be reasonable to expect
mothers of young children and persons with certain types of
medical problems to work as many hours as able-bodied, single,
childless adults. See Wax, A Reciprocal Welfare Program, supra
note 10, at 477, 491-97; see also Amy L. Wax, Something for
Nothing, supra note 10. For a different perspective on a unified
approach to policy for low income workers, see Matthew Diller,
Entitlement and Exclusion: The Role of Disability in the Social
Welfare System, 44 UCLA L. REV. 361 (1996). 
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in the same job category. Rather, it contemplates something more
modest: that all persons be guaranteed a decent minimum if they
put forward what is deemed a reasonable effort to support
themselves through work, and their failure to earn enough to live
on is not their fault. 
These insights suggest a number of directions for modifying
and revising national policy for the disabled and for low wage
workers generally. First, the government should take seriously a
commitment to subsidize the earnings of the disabled as part of a
broader, unified approach towards guaranteeing that all low
income workers who satisfy certain minimum requirements receive
an adequate income.39 Second, we should consider moving away from
benefits programs that rely on bright-line, all-or-nothing
findings of disability, and which excuse work and pledge complete
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support for those who meet the threshold criteria while offering
no assistance to those who do not. Although creating categories
of partial disability is potentially very cumbersome and might be
rejected on administrative grounds alone, it should be taken
seriously and examined carefully as more consistent with the
priorities identified here. Third, there should be a renewed
emphasis on rehabilitation, vocational counseling, and job
placement for the disabled, as well as on programs to educate
employers and help them integrate and utilize disabled workers
more effectively. Such programs are more consistent with a
baseline expectation that all persons belong in the workforce
unless clearly unsuited to any kind of gainful employment.
Finally, the ADA must be reassessed in light of a basic
structure that imposes on employers the costs of mandates that
benefit society as a whole. As noted earlier in this Article, the
ADA is not necessarily inefficient overall, given the basic
safety net and regulatory programs to which our society is
committed. Rather, its principal design flaw is that it forces
employers to pay costs that should arguably be borne by everyone. 
Against the backdrop of real-life labor markets and society’s
pledge to help the disabled, the ADA effectively ends up shifting
costs from taxpayers to employers. As noted, employers will not
always be able to adjust compensation downward towards a “market-
clearing wage” for those of their disabled employees who are not
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as productive as others. This generates a “disconnect” between
employers’ lack of interest in hiring the disabled, and society’s
(and taxpayers’) interest—whether cost-effective or not,
depending on circumstances—in putting disabled persons to work to
help defray their burden of support. What is rational and cost-
effective for society as a whole or, alternatively, for taxpayers
who must pay the cost of disability benefits programs—which is to
have disabled persons “earn their own way” or at least appear to
do so —may not always be cost-effective for the employer. But
even when putting disabled persons to work is not efficient for
the system as a whole, taxpayers may still (perversely) want to
off-load the costs of supporting the disabled on private
employers by enforcing hiring mandates. 
That employers who save society money by hiring the disabled
may end up losing money themselves suggests that the employer
mandates embodied in the ADA are vulnerable to political abuse.
One point of this essay is that these externalities may sometimes
create an efficient result. Sometimes, however, they will not,
and there is no inherent guarantee that they will have a happy
outcome in every case or in most cases. The balance between
efficiency and inefficiency will in part depend on how courts
construe the ADA’s commands. Because taxpayers enjoy a benefit at
the expense of employers under the ADA regardless of whether the
outcome is cost-effective, political forces might tilt towards
40. EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 493-94.
41. See PHELPS, supra note 33, at 35.
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overly generous mandates. That is a result worth guarding
against.  The cost shifting inherent in the ADA should be more
forthrightly acknowledged and more thought should be given to
measures that will alleviate the burdens the ADA imposes on
businesses.
The analysis presented here supports the view that the
employer mandates of the ADA lack fundamental fairness and place
too onerous a burden on employers. Reform in the precise terms of
the ADA and in its enforcement– by, for example, relaxing the
standard of reasonable accommodation or modifying the definition
of core ability to perform the job to give more leeway to
employers—may help a little, but can only take us so far. Where
putting more disabled persons to work makes economic sense, it
may be better to try to find ways to help employers defray the
costs of accomplishing that goal. In this vein, Richard Epstein
has proposed grants to businesses willing to hire and accommodate
the disabled.40 Other proposals to subsidize the hiring of low-
productivity workers41 might be extended to the disability
context. Leaving aside the pragmatic pros and cons of specific
proposals, however, the main purpose of this essay is to show how
the current design of the ADA can be faulted for confounding the
true costs and benefits of the valuable social project of
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enabling the disabled to contribute to their own support. Greater
transparency in the assessment of the consequences for everyone
of the mandates that are currently in place, although perhaps not
fully achievable, might inspire a more careful rethinking of the
ADA’s design and effects.
